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CRIMINAL LAW
SENTENCING EDDIE
GERARD E. LYNCH*
I.
The mandatory minimum sentences attached to federal
narcotics violations have come in for plenty of criticism. The
United States Sentencing Commission in 1991 submitted a
lengthy report critical of the mandatory minimum provisions.2
A political protest organization, Families Against Mandatory
Minimums, has been formed, and has gotten some media atten-
tion.3  Newspaper columnists,4  professional commentators,'
judges,6 and academics,7 have criticized the statutes. Amidst the
United States DistrictJudge, Southern District of New York; PaulJ. Kellner Pro-
fessor of Law, Columbia University.
' See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1) (1994).
2 See U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, Special Report to The Congress: Mandatoy Mlninum
Penalties In the Federal CriminalJustice System (1991).
' See, e.g., Tom Schoenberg, Advocate Gains by Time Served: Decade-Old E'MMIAI Ex-
pands Agenda, LEGALT ES, Mar. 5, 2001, at 1.
See, e.g., Bob Hebert, The Truth About Justice, N.Y. TIMcES, Sept. 18, 2000, at A 25;
Michael Isikoff & Tracy Thompson, Getting Too Tough on Drugs: Draconian Sentences
Hurt Small Offenders More than Kingpins, WASH. PosT, Nov. 4, 1990, at C 1.
5 See, e.g., Ronald Weich, The Battle Against Mandatory Minimums: A Report from the
Front Lines, 9 FED. SENTENG G REP. 94 (1996); Henry Scott Wallace, Mandatoly Mini-
mums and the Betrayal of Sentencing Reform: A Legislative Dr. Jdyll and Mr. Hyde, 40 FE.
B. NEws &J. 158, 158 (1993) (arguing that Congress has been "impulsive, reckless,
driven by unquenchable political passions" when passing mandatory minimum stat-
utes).
See, e.g., William W. Schwarzer, Sentencing Guidelines and Mandatoy Mnrmunms:
MixingApples and Oranges, 66 S. CAL L. REV. 405 (1992).
See, e.g., Douglas A- Berman, A Common Law For This Age of Federal Sentencing: The
Opportunity and Need ForJudicial Lawmaking, 11 STAN. L & PoLy' REV. 93, 99 (1999)
("The enactment of these mandatory sentencing statutes has confirmed reformers'
concerns about the institutional deficiencies of legislatures when involved in detailed
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controversy over President Clinton's last-minute pardons of
various offenders, his pardons of a number of marginal defen-
dants sentenced to lengthy terms under these statutes have
drawn little or no objection.8 Even Chief Justice Rehnquist, a
strong voice for law enforcement, has denounced mandatory
minimum sentences as having little serious justification. 9
In an effort to make the effects of the statutes more vivid,
critics have searched out examples of extreme injustice created
by the statutes. The examples cited are usually minor accom-
plices in the narcotics trade, usually women, often pressured by
men in their lives to participate in some modest way (such as
courier or bookkeeper or message-taker) in a drug transaction
or conspiracy involving a quantity of drugs that triggers a five- or
ten-year mandatory minimum. In the ideal case study, the de-
fendant is only marginally culpable, her contribution to the
crime is minimal, she received little or no compensation, and
the transaction is just barely over the statutory floor.
It is easy to construct hypothetical examples of such ex-
treme cases in which a defendant qualifies for a mandatory
minimum sentence when any sensible person would question
whether the actor should be incarcerated at all. And, tragically,
such cases are not only hypothetical: real-life examples can be
sentencing lawmaking"); Kenneth R. Feinberg, Federal Sentencing Reform: Congress and
the United States Sentencing Commission, 28 WAIt FOREST L. REv. 291, 302-03 (1993)
(Congress's enactment of "mandatory sentencing has played havoc with the orderly
guideline system").
* If anything, these pardons have drawn praise. See, e.g., Joe Davidson, Clinton's
Tough Prison Watch, CHRLSTtMN SC. MONrTOR, Mar. 27, 2001, at 11 (describing
Clinton's commutations for "about 20 prisoners serving mandatory minimum drug
sentences" as "much too little, much too late"); Lenore Skenazy, This Clinton Pardon
Makes a Telling Point, N.Y. NEWsDAy, Mar. 7, 2001, at 33 ("while everyone is talking
about the message Clinton's pardons are sending, let's hope his pardon of Loretta
Fish [who had been sentenced to nineteen years after unknowingly lending herjeep
to a drug-dealing boyfriend] sends this one loud and clear: It is time to repeal the
disastrous mandatory minimum sentencing laws"); Stuart TaylorJr., Good Pardons, Bad
Laws, and Bush's Unique Opportunity, NAT'LJ., Feb. 17, 2001, at 466 ("The uproar over
ex-President Clinton's abuse of his pardon power in some cases has overshadowed his
salutary use of it in others-in particular, his commutations of the savagely severe
prison terms of more than 20 nonviolent, nondangerous bit players in drug deals").
' "Mandatory minimums . .. are frequently the result of floor amendments to
demonstrate emphatically that legislators want to 'get tough on crime.' Just as fre-
quently they do not involve any careful consideration of the effect they might have on
the sentencing guidelines as a whole." William H. Rehnquist, Luncheon Address, in
U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, Drugs and Vwlence in America 283, 287 (1993).
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found.' Such cases, however, are relatively few. Prosecutorial
discretion usually finds a way to avoid dramatic injustices. The
cases that remain are sometimes the product of misguided tacti-
cal decisions by defendants or defense lawyers-who refuse more
reasonable plea offers. This fact, of course, does not excuse the
shockingly unjust results occasionally produced-even one sin-
gle injustice is too many, and the fact that a defendant could
have avoided an extreme sentence by waiving her constitutional
right to trial is neither a comfort nor a justification for an un-
duly harsh sentence. But it does render the public debate about
mandatory minimums, like the debate about many criminal jus-
tice issues, somewhat artificial and sensational, as opponents
cite unusual anecdotes about unbelievably cruel outcomes,
while proponents counter with equally exotic instances of un-
reasonably lenient discretionary sentences that, they say, wrar-
rant legislative control.
It is much harder to discuss the more routine and modest
injustices produced by mandatory minimums. We have a lan-
guage, and even some widely agreed-upon standards, for argu-
ing about the essentially binary questions of guilt or innocence,
or even of jail or no-jail, that make it intelligible to say, "This
person should not be in prison." But, once it is agreed that a
given defendant ought to go to jail, or even that his sentence
should be "serious" or "severe," how do we argue about whether
a five- or ten-year sentence is too much, or a three- or seven-year
sentence too little?
The difficulty of deriving an objective basis for determining
the absolute level of sentence appropriate to a particular of-
fense is a well-known difficulty of "just deserts" sentencing."
'o See, e.g., Dan Gardner, Civil Liberties Cast Aside in Ovr'eyzalous Drug War CM-. SLt
TIMEs, Feb. 4, 2001, at 30A (citing examples); John Cloud, A Gel-Tough Polu, That
Failed, TINME, Feb. 1, 1999, at 48 (citing examples and observing that "we now live in a
country where it's common to get a longer sentence for selling a neighbor a joint
than for, say, sexually abusing her"); Henry Weinstein, 5 Ounces of Crach Brrngs Life
Term With No Parole, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1989, at Al.
" Under the "just deserts" model of sentencing, once a defendant has been con-
victed of a crime, not only is it "just" to punish that defendant, but the severity of the
punishment should be determined solely by the seriousness of the offense, inflicting
neither more nor less suffering than the defendant "deserves" in light of the gravity of
the crime. See, e.g., IGOR PRIMORATZ, JUSMMYNG LEGAL PUNSHMtEtNT 147-18 (1989)
("Justice in these matters is to treat offenders according to their deserts, to give them
what they deserve, not more, and not less"). That model, however, "requires only
that we assign greater penalties as we ascend the scale of crimes, without ever supply-
ing a starting point (the penalty for the least serious offense) or telling us b, ho, mucd
2001] 549
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The relative severity of sentences for different offenses can be
rationally argued about: though it is possible to argue that sell-
ing drugs is a form of murder, most people would conclude that
the penalty for intentional killing should be more severe than
that for dealing cocaine; hence, the popularity among oppo-
nents of mandatory minimums of pointing out that the sen-
tences meted out to mid-level narcotics dealers under those
statutes exceeds the average time served in some states for those
convicted of manslaughter or murder.1 2 But if most would agree
that this is an anomalous result, the argument that drug dealers
should receive lower sentences than murderers tells us nothing
about where the injustice lies: should the drug sentences be
lowered or the murder penalties increased? For most people,
including most judges, prosecutors and wardens, whether a cer-
tain number of years of incarceration is too much, too little or
just right for a particular offense (at least within a very large
range of tolerance set by grossly excessive or lenient extremes)
probably depends more on what they are accustomed to than
on any reasoned or deeply intuited belief in a particular level of
sentence.1
Moreover, even to the extent that a language for addressing
these issues can be developed, it is difficult, both morally and
politically, to argue that sentences provided for particular
crimes are excessive. This is not simply a function of a long-
standing political climate in the United States that favors
toughness on criminals. As with the defense of pardons or
other devices to mitigate punishment, an argument for sentenc-
ing leniency must start with the proposition that the defendant
committed an act that is worthy of punishment-indeed, an act
to increase the penalty as we move from one crime to the next in the scale." David
Dolinko, Three Mistakes of Retributivism, 39 UCLA L. REv. 1623, 1636 (1992); see also
Ernest van den Haag, Punishment: Desert and Crime Control, 85 MicH. L. REV. 1250, 1254
(1987) ("Just deserts fails even more fundamentally to tell us what is deserved for any
crime.").
'2 See, e.g.,Joshua W. Shenk, Why You Can Hate Drugs and Still Want To Legalize Them,
WASH. MONTHLY, Oct. 1995, at 32, 35 ("[T]hanks to mandatory minimum sentences.
. . [nion-violent drug offenders receive an average 60 months in jail time, five times
the average 12-month-sentence for manslaughter convicts").
" Even if public opinion surveys showed widespread agreement within a particular
society about the appropriate level of sentence for various offenses, the respondents'
views would be shaped by the practice within their community, and would not neces-
sarily reflect either intrinsic moral intuitions or reasoned conclusions, since all of
those polled would have been exposed to a regular diet of publicity about sentences
imposed in actual cases.
550 (Vol. 9 1
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that is so serious a violation of the rights of others or of society
at large that the stigma of criminal conviction, and deprivation
of liberty, is an appropriate social response. Grimes are by defi-
nition terrible acts, and once it is conceded that an individual
deserves punishment, and has no defense that justifies or ex-
cuses his conduct, how can one argue that a particular sentence
is "too much," without seeming to denigrate the seriousness of
misconduct that is by definition immoral, dangerous, and
deeply disturbing to public order? The fact is that violent
criminals, those who sell dangerous illegal substances, and even
many offenders against property, have inflicted harm on society
and on individual victims that cannot adequately be repaid by
any punishment that we could decently inflict. Against the
background of the suffering of victims of crime and drug abuse,
it is not easy to argue that some term of imprisonment is simply
too much for the perpetrator.
For all of these reasons, the argument that a given manda-
tory sentence is excessive is a difficult one to make, in any but
the most extreme cases. But that argument must be made, or
we will be left with the distorted view that the problem of man-
datory minimum sentences can be solved by creating a small
safety valve to allow a reduced sentence for some narrowly-
defined set of aberrant cases.' 4 The day-to-day excessiveness of
sentences that are "only" a few years too long will go on.
II.
So let me introduce you to a more typical "victim" of the
mandatory minimum sentence provisions. Eddie is about as
randomly selected as can be: he happens to be the very first per-
son I was called upon to sentence after taking office as a federal
districtjudge. He is worth writing about precisely because he is
nobody's poster child for reforming mandatory minimum sen-
tences. There is no question in my mind that most people
would regard him as a good candidate for severe treatment at
the hands of the law, and I'm not about to dispute that view.
Eddie was found guilty by a jury of conspiring to sell co-
caine. He was the last man standing from a twenty-five defen-
'" See; e.g.,18 U.S.C. § 3553(0 (1994);Jane L Froyd, Comment, Safety Valve Failure:
LoztLevel Drug Offenders and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 94 Nw. U. L REV. 1471
(2000) (arguing for the elimination of the five safety valve requirements and for their
replacement with a single definition of low level offender).
20011
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dant indictment; everyone else had pled guilty. Eddie (like
many of the defendants) was a somewhat marginal member of
the "organization." Perhaps, indeed, he balked at pleading
guilty because he didn't see himself as a co-conspirator at all.
The evidence showed that Eddie sold cocaine to a number of
steady customers, and bought from the principal defendant, a
wholesaler of substantial quantities of the drug. By law, Eddie's
involvement as a regular, re-selling customer of the drug ring
makes him a co-conspirator with the other members in the dis-
tribution of narcotics, but in economic reality he was likely less a
partner or employee of the wholesaler than an independent
contractor, looking to secure a reliable supplier to the extent
that he could, but no doubt as prepared as any other retail mer-
chant to shift allegiance to another wholesaler if a new dealer
came along offering better quality or price, or a more regular
source of supply.
How much cocaine did Eddie sell? Both the sentencing
guidelines and the mandatory minimum statutes make it impor-
tant to know just how much cocaine Eddie was responsible for.
But the amount in question is inherently unknowable. The jury
was justified in concluding that Eddie was in the regular busi-
ness of selling drugs. Unlike a bank robber or murderer, Eddie
was not someone who from time to time planned discrete, par-
ticular jobs, or was now and then tempted by one or more op-
portunities for profit, or was inspired by passion to commit a
particular horrible act. Rather, he had for some period of time
a regular business or trade of selling a particular commodity.
He almost certainly sold more than the government knew
about, and if he had not been arrested he would surely have
gone on selling. Had he been arrested in connection with a
particular sale (say, if he had made the mistake of selling to an
undercover officer or a drug user who had a reason to "turn"
and become a police informant), the scope of his activities
known by the authorities might have looked much narrower. As
it was, he was caught because the government was focusing a
major investigation on his supplier, and overheard him negoti-
ating on a couple of occasions with the supplier, whose phone
was tapped. No amounts were discussed, though a fair-minded
juror could have reasonably concluded that the transactions
were intended for resale and not for personal use. The critical
evidence of amount was provided by a "cooperating witness"-a
violent thug who was the bodyguard and general factotum of
[Vol. 91
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the supplier. This individual, his reliability guaranteed by his
decision to testify for the government in exchange for leniency,
estimated that he saw Eddie purchase cocaine in one and two
ounce quantities (sometimes more) on at least ten occasions.
The government thus contended, with some justice, that Eddie
was involved in transactions that, conservatively, involved five
hundred grams or more of cocaine. A reasonable person would
be concerned that the witness might have exaggerated-but a
reasonable person would also have some confidence that the
witness was not privy to all of Eddie's dealings.
Moreover, Eddie vas not a first offender. Now aged fifty-
three, he spent a year in prison in his youth as the getaway
driver in an armed robbery of a mail truck, and was convicted
again in a drunk driving incident a few years later. His youthful
offenses were few and isolated, however, and he then went a
long time without further arrests. Most unusually, he seems to
have gotten in serious trouble again only after age forty, with an
apparently late-life turn to drugs: possession of heroin at age
forty-three, leading to unsuccessful drug treatment; another
fairly dramatic driving incident a few years later; then yet an-
other driving incident that led to drug possession charges.
Then, a much more serious drug charge: a conviction in Flor-
ida, at age forty-nine, along with three co-defendants, for con-
spiracy to purchase three kilograms of cocaine from an
undercover officer. There are three interesting facts about this
offense: it was Eddie's first arrest, let alone conviction, for a se-
rious crime since his youthful robbery; it was his first criminal
venture outside the New York area; and although it was his first
involvement in the sort of crime that might suggest serious
profit from illegality, he apparently (as in his robbery case) was
regarded as only a bit player, a mere lookout. There is one in-
teresting fact about its disposition: Eddie was sentenced to pro-
bation. IF
" Those of us who practice in the federal system and worry about the federal
guidelines pay far too little attention to the fact that federal prosecution accounts for
a tiny percentage of all criminal cases. Thus, any arguable deterrent effect of severe
federal drug sentences is dissipated to the extent that most offenders are sentenced
in state court, under regimes that vary enormously in severity. Many federal prisoners
experience a pattern of several state sentences that earn them probation or minor jail
terms before landing in federal court and receiving, to their shock, a far more severe
sentence for essentially similar conduct. This pattern would be less disturbing if the
decision to prosecute cases in federal court were based on a conscious selection of
the most serious cases. Sometimes this is indeed the case; federal investigative agen-
2001] 553
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Though current sentencing guidelines treat such matters as
irrelevant, it is worth noting that at the time of his sentencing
Eddie had been married for over twenty years and had three
teen-aged children, to whom he had provided steady financial
and emotional support. He served honorably in the military in
Vietnam, earning a number of medals and citations before be-
ing honorably discharged as a sergeant. Despite receiving dis-
ability payments from the Veterans Administration for Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder, and despite his attributing his drug
usage to his military experience, he has maintained a steady re-
cord of employment throughout his life.
Despite these favorable aspects of his life history, I assume
most judges, and most citizens, would regard Eddie as a candi-
date for a reasonably severe sentence. Whatever one thinks of
the policy costs and benefits of the war on drugs, the sale of co-
caine has been emphatically outlawed by the people's elected
representatives. Those who undertake to make money from the
trade in illegal substances do so knowing that they are violating
the law, and knowing that they are preying on the weaknesses of
mostly poor people by providing them with dangerous and ad-
dictive substances. One can reasonably believe that non-
criminal responses to drug abuse might serve the country better
than our current efforts to solve the problem by criminal law,
but one can't reasonably have much sympathy for people-par-
ticularly people who have skills, job opportunities, and matur-
ity-who engage in a harmful and illegal trade out of greed.
Moreover, this particular defendant had only shortly before
been convicted of another drug trafficking offense, and had
benefited from judicial leniency on that occasion. Reasonable
people can disagree over whether sending him to prison for an
extended period is enlightened or even sensible social policy,
but it is, for better or worse, our social policy, adopted by demo-
cratically-elected officials and generally endorsed by a majority
of the nation's people. It is clear to me that it is a judge's duty
to enforce that policy, whether or not she would vote for it as a
cies tend to focus their attention on larger rings and more significant offenders. But
the selection is often far more random. Small fry are caught up in multi-defendant
federal prosecutions because federal agencies investigated a large organization of
which they were small parts. Thresholds for determining what cases are "large" vary
from place to place, and political or bureaucratic battles among prosecutors and law
enforcement authorities often have more to do with whether a case is prosecuted in
state or federal court than the seriousness of the offense.
554 [Vol. 91
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legislator, out of respect for the law of a democratic polity.
Moreover, even ajudge who might generally favor more lenient
(or more severe) penalties than most of her colleagues must
consider the important interest in horizontal equity among of-
fenders. Where ajudge has discretion, she should exercise it as
wisely as she can, and not defer mindlessly to what her col-
leagues might do; yet, some deference must be paid to main-
stream judicial views, since it is unjust that sentences should
swing wildly from extreme to extreme depending on the per-
sonality or politics of the particularjudge doing the sentencing.
Thus, even for a judge with some skepticism about the jus-
tice and efficacy of the severity of our current drug sentences,
Eddie seems a candidate for a serious sentence. He has broken
a law that our legislators and citizens want treated with particu-
lar seriousness. Unlike the poster children for the repeal of
mandatory minimums, he is a mature, employed man and a
home-owner (not youthful and without prospects); he was ap-
parently a dealer (if on a smallish scale) in his own right and
not a mere employee or flunky of another; he did not act under
duress, or with marginal knowledge or culpability. Among the
ranks even of drug violators, his prior record must rank him
among the less sympathetic offenders: not only was he a recidi-
vist, but he was one who had benefited from leniency on his
most recent arrest, and returned immediately to dealing.
M.
But if we agree that Eddie does not deserve leniency, we still
are left to ask, what should his sentence actually be? You can try
this on your friends, lawyers and non-lawyers alike, and you will
almost surely get a range of answers. I can pick a number as
well as anyone else, and before 1987 that's more or less what
judges were asked to do-pick the number that they thought,
taking all of the above facts and more into account, was the fair-
est sentence. But I don't have a lot of confidence, and I doubt
that any of your more intelligent and thoughtful friends will
have much either, that the number that any of us picks repre-
sents some objectively correct just desert. Most of my law stu-
dents, faced with questions like this, insist (with considerable
point, I think) that they simply cannot answer, without knowing
more about the system: what is the going rate for this and other
offenses? They realize instinctively that the question is intrinsi-
cally a relative one, and that the answer should be worked out
2001]
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by reference to what punishment is, or roughly should be, im-
posed on a range of other offenders, from murderers to litter-
ers. At the extremes, there are some widespread non-relative
opinions: almost no one thinks life imprisonment is appropri-
ate, and almost no one thinks someone like Eddie should es-
capejail altogether. But the range of actual numbers, if people
are pressured to give some, is likely quite wide.
I shouldn't keep you in suspense any longer about the ac-
tual sentence. Of course, there is only the most modest sus-
pense anyway for those readers familiar with federal sentencing.
The amount of cocaine attributable to Eddie exceeds five hun-
dred grams, and so he is subject to a mandatory minimum sen-
tence of five years (and a maximum of forty, well beyond his life
expectancy). " As a prior narcotics offender, moreover, if the
government chooses to file a prior felony information, the
mandatory minimum is doubled to ten years.
Of course, the mandatory minimum sentence could be am-
plified even further. While Eddie himself, if we credit the in-
formant witness, only can be proved to have purchased for
resale about five hundred grams of cocaine, he was arguably a
member (whether or not he would have so considered himself)
of what he surely knew was a larger organization, and by his acts
he certainly could be found to have joined a conspiracy whose
(accomplished) objects included the distribution of significantly
larger quantities of cocaine, indeed of an amount in excess of
five kilograms of the drug. The government, in fact, charged
him initially with membership in precisely such a conspiracy, a
charge that would have subjected him to a mandatory minimum
of ten years (maximum: life),' which in turn would be doubled
by his prior drug felony to a twenty-year sentence, something
pretty close to a life term for a man his age.
As it happens, the government chose not to pursue this
charge. Under Apprendi v. New Jersey,'9 it is arguable (and I
would argue) that the federal narcotics law creates three sepa-
6 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1) (B) (1994).
7 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b) (1) (A), 851(a)(1)(1994). The only suspense is whether the
government chose to file the information, but experienced practitioners will be in lit-
tle doubt about the answer. Perhaps if Eddie had pled guilty, the prosecutor might
have been willing to forego the filing in order to secure a certain conviction. But
Eddie went to trial. Enough said: no mercy.
,621 U.S.C. §§ 841 (b) (1) (A), 846 (1994).
, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
556 (Vol. 91
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rate offenses (in effect, drug distribution in the first, second,
and third degree), with separate sentencing ranges of zero-to-
twenty, five-to-forty, and ten-to-life (with enhanced versions car-
rying doubled minima for prior offenders). At any rate, it is not
disputable, after Apprend that a defendant can't be subjected to
a higher sentence than the maximum for the lowest category, un-
less the jury specifically finds that the offense involved a quantity
of drugs that moves him into the next higher category."
The prosecutors decided, no doubt influenced in part by
the belief that twenty-to-life was a bit extreme for a small-time
dealer like Eddie, that it was the better part of tactical trial wis-
dom to submit to the jury only one question about amount,
rather than a checklist of possible findings, and to confine their
argument to requesting the jury to find that Eddie had con-
spired to distribute only those amounts they could actually put
into his hands. Accordingly, the government dropped the
highest charge, sought (and received) ajury verdict only of con-
spiring to distribute more than half a kilo, and argued (success-
fully) to the Probation Department and the judge that the
defendant was subject to a mandatory minimum of "only" ten
years.
IV.
Was the sentence unjustly harsh? It certainly seems a very
heavy sentence to me, but as noted above I don't know that I
have a reliable, objective basis for deciding how severe is too se-
vere. But I can provide a comparison, both in bottom-line and
20 Whether the Constitution permits imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence
based on a nonjury, preponderance-of-the-evidence finding of a drug amount not
charged in the indictment, and whether, if it does, Congress intended to create man-
datory minimum sentences that float free of the enhanced maximum sentences it cre-
ated, are unsettled questions. Compare McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986)
(upholding state statute pursuant to which anyone convicted of certain felonies
would be subject to a mandatory minimum penalty of five years imprisonment if the
judge found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant "visibly pos-
sessed a firearm" in the course of committing the felony), with Apprendi, 530 U.S. at
487 n. 13 (though not "overruling Mclillan" per se, "limit(ing] its holding to cases
that do not involve the imposition of a sentence more severe than the statutory
maximum for the offense established by the jury's verdict"). The Court reserved "for
another day the question whether stare decisis considerations preclude reconsidera-
tion of [McMil/an's] narrower holding." See also Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 498, 520-21
(Thomas, J., concurring) (advocating a "broader rule" which covers the "Mealfillan
situation of a mandatory minimum sentence").
2001] 557
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in methodology, to another way of calculating Eddie's sentence:
the much-vilified sentencing guidelines.
I don't mean to hold up the guidelines as a model of abso-
lute justice. As will become clear shortly, I have my own objec-
tions to their approach to drug sentences. But I think the
guidelines can provide a basis for assessing the mandatory
minimum sentences. No one thinks that the guidelines are un-
duly lenient on drugs, or that they were created by a bunch of
bleeding hearts. Indeed, the guidelines use the mandatory
minimum sentence drug amounts as guideposts to their own
sentencing structure. It is perhaps appropriate, then, to con-
sider that a sentence that exceeds the guideline range just
might be excessive.
Given the amount of cocaine attributed to Eddie, the guide-
lines provide for an offense level of 26.2' No adjustments apply.
For first offenders, or those with only a minor criminal history,
this would translate to a sentence of just over five years.22 But
Eddie's criminal history category presents a more interesting
calculation. His early offenses are disregarded as too old, 2 but
he gets one criminal history point for each of his two drug pos-
session charges and his Florida drug trafficking conviction. 4
This alone would move him above the basic criminal history
category, but because he was on probation for the Florida of-
fense when he committed the present crime, he gets a two-point
"bonus, "2which puts him into a still higher criminal history
category. 2' The total guideline sentence for Eddie, then, would
be 78-97 months.27 His most likely sentence, then, would have
been six and a half years in prison. 28 I would call that a rather
"U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2Dl.1 (c) (7) (2000).
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL Ch. 5 Pt. A (Sentencing Table) (level 26,
criminal history category I (63-78 months)).
2' U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.2(e).21 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.1 (c).
2U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.1(d).
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL Ch. 5 Pt. A (Sentencing Table). Three
points would translate to Criminal History Category II, but five points places him in
Category III.
27Id. (level 26, criminal history category III).
28 In our district, it is unusual for defendants to be sentenced beyond the bottom
of the available sentencing range. I don't think Eddie would be a good candidate for
elevation above this level. Most, if not all, of the negative aspects of his conduct and
history-his prior criminal convictions and the amount of his drug dealing-has been
taken into account in setting the range; his favorable personal circumstances (em-
ployment and military record and family circumstances), on the other hand, have not
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severe sentence, perhaps more than I might have imposed if the
law left me complete discretion. But I could have imposed the
guideline sentence without feeling that the sentence was out of
line with any reasonable conception ofjustice.
Judged by the guideline standard, then, the mandatory
minimum sentence required in this case is excessive, to the tune
of three and one-half years-nearly a fifty percent increase in
the length of incarceration. Moreover, a comparison of the
method by which the guidelines and the statutory provision arrive
at their results suggests that the guideline approach-flawed as I
think it is-is by a good deal the more sophisticated, and the
fairer, system.
Both the guidelines and the mandatory minimum terms
have been criticized by liberals for not taking into account facts
about the personal history of the offender. Both systems rely
on only two types of factors in setting a sentence: the seriousness
of the offense and the offender's record of prior convictions.
But within those limitations, the guidelines are vastly more nu-
anced. This is evident, even in Eddie's case, in the criminal his-
tory calculation. The mandatory minimum provision is
extremely crude and simplistic: any prior conviction for a "fel-
ony drug offense" triggers the doubling of the mandatory
minimum; conversely, the ordinary minimum would apply re-
gardless of the number or severity of the offender's prior non-
drug convictions. Thus, by way of example, if Eddie had been
convicted in South Dakota for simple possession of two or more
been. Presumably, the higher end of the range should be reserved for those who
lacked those points in their favor, or had other anti-social traits not accounted for in
the guidelines.
See, e.g., Judge Weinstein's bleak view of the Guidelines: "[Because the Guide-
lines] tend to deaden the sense that a judge must treat each defendant as a unique
human being... it is quite possible that we judges will cease to aspire to the highest
traditions of humanity and personal responsibility that ought to characterize our of-
fice." Jack B. Weinstein, A Trial Judge's Second Impression of the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 357, 366 (1992). But one does not have to be a liberal, or a
believer in rehabilitationist theories of penology, to question these approaches.
Thoughtful conservatives should also recognize that by taking discretion away from
judges, the guidelines merely give it to other actors in the system. Se,, e.g., KATE STrH
AND JOSE A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL
CouRTs 126 (1998) ("[Bly squeezing discretion out of the judicial domain, the
Guidelines have required it to expand elsewhere, shifting the locus, but not necessar-
ily the quantity, of disparity. Moreover, many of the present sources of disparate
treatment, camouflaged and concealed, are less consonant with our constitutional
values than the open and unabashed exercise of judicial discretion of the old or-
der.").
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ounces of marijuana, ° he would be subject to the ten-year
minimum, but if he had a prior record for multiple murders
and rapes, he would only be required to serve five years.
The guidelines, in contrast, make a fairly sophisticated ef-
fort to assess the weight of an offender's prior record. The rec-
ord is judged not by the presence or absence of a single prior
drug offense, but on a sliding scale with six basic categories,
plus some additional refinements. Offenders with more prior
convictions get more points, and thus greater sentence en-
hancement, than those with only one, and they get more or
fewer points for each offense depending on the severity of the
crime, judged primarily by the sentence served for it.3' The rec-
ord is judged more harshly if the defendant committed crimes
while on probation or parole (a factor that would hurt Eddie
under the guidelines), or shortly after release from prison. On
the other hand, prior offenses in the distant past are not
counted . In Eddie's case, for example, a serious crime com-
mitted thirty years ago was disregarded; had this been his first
offense since then, he would have been treated by the guide-
lines (appropriately, in my view) as a first offender, and the of-
fense would not enhance his punishment for the present crime.
But if that thirty-year-old crime had been a drug felony (rather
than a "mere" armed robbery), the mandatory minimum provi-
sion would have added five years to his sentence, even if he had
gone straight for the entire thirty years between.
The relative degrees of subtlety of the guidelines and the
mandatory minima with respect to assessing the offense conduct
itself is hidden in Eddie's case, because none of the adjustments
available under the guidelines actually apply to his case. Note,
however, that the mandatory minima are triggered by amount
of narcotics only, and only in rather crude increments. The
mandatories click in, for powder cocaine, at five hundred grams
(five years) and five kilos (ten years).3' The guidelines, in con-
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-42-6 (Michi 1998) ("It is a Class 6 felony to possess more
than two ounces of marijuana but less than one-half pound of marjuana.").
' U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4Al.1 (a)-(c) (2000).
s2 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDEINES MANUAL § 4AI.I (d), (e).
"U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.2(e).
', Since the mandatory minima for crack cocaine, calculated at the unjustifiable ra-
tio of 100 to 1 to powder cocaine, are unspeakable, we will not speak of them. But see
Michael Tonry, Rethinking Unthinkable Punishment Policies in America, 46 UCLA L. REV.
1751 (1999) (giving detailed criticisms of the crack ratio).
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trast, have 4 different sentencing levels in the range from 400
grams to 5 kilos, and a total of 16 graduated levels from under
25 grams to over 1500 kilos, that can take an offender from 10
months in prison to life.
And that set of adjustments involves only the amount of the
drug involved in the offense. The guidelines' (and the stat-
utes') obsession with amount is one of their major vulnerabili-
ties to criticism. Particularly because the amounts are
cumulative-that is, multiple sales are aggregated to calculate a
sentence based on a single total quantity-they can have the
perverse effect of treating minor players in the drug trade the
same as wholesalers or importers, by treating a large number of
street-level deals as the equivalent of one or more significant
transactions. For professional criminals employed in an illegal
industry, the snapshot of an offender's conduct captured by ar-
resting officers is somewhat arbitrary. For example, a street-
comer seller of crack by the vial who is convicted of selling a
single dose to an undercover officer is exactly the same person
who might be observed on that comer for a week selling vial af-
ter vial for an eight-hour shift, seven days a week. The differ-
ence in "offense conduct" between the two cases (one vial or
hundreds, a difference of years in prison) depends not on how
bad or dangerous the offender is, but on whether the police
targeted the seller in a simple undercover street operation, or as
part of a larger effort aimed at identifying higher-ups. Someone
dealing in kilo quantities, even once, occupies a higher rung on
the industry's ladder than someone who sells by the gram, even
if he sells, over the course of time, one thousand grams.!
But if the guidelines might do better to take a still more so-
phisticated view of the trade, at least they allow for aggravating
' Prior to passage in 1984 of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act, drug
amounts were generally irrelevant to most drug crimes. The Senate Report to the
Crime Control Act explained the decision to make amount an element of the crime
(or at least relevant to sentencing) as follows:
First, with the exception of offenses involving marijuana.., the severity of current drug
penalties is determined exclusively by the nature of the controlled substance involved ...
[but] another important factor [should be] the amount of the drug involved. Without the
inclusion of this factor, penalties for trafficking in espedally large quantities ... are often
inadequate.
S. REP. No. 98-225, at 255-57 (1983) (Comprehensive Crime Control Act). It is ques-
tionable, for the reasons discussed above, whether the purpose of taking quantity into
account (punishing the kingpins who traffic in large quantities) is served by the
amount-mania that underlies present-day statutes and guidelines.
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and mitigating circumstances. Under the statutory mandate,
anyone who has any involvement in a transaction involving five
hundred grams of cocaine must receive a five-year sentence,
whether the defendant owned the drugs and would profit from
their sale, or was simply a driver or courier participating for a
modest fee. The guidelines, in contrast, provide, with respect to
drug transactions and organizations of every size, enhanced
punishments for those who are managers or supervisors, and
lowered ones for those who are more marginal participants,"
and provide special enhancements for certain specialists, like pi-
lots and armed muscle. 37 If I were writing the guidelines, I
would probably reverse the relative importance of roles in the
trade versus sheer quantities of drugs, but the guidelines at least
take the defendant's role in the offense into account. Under
the guidelines, among players in a five-kilo cocaine deal, some-
one (with no prior record) who organized and led a team of five
or more participants (including one who was a minor) in or-
chestrating the deal would face a recommended minimum of at
least 235 months (nearly twenty years),- while someone who
played a truly minimal role in the same deal could get as little as
seventy-eight months (six and a half years) .39 The mandatory
minimum is simply ten years, regardless.
This analysis provides us with another reason to consider
the mandatory minimum sentences unjustly severe. In the eyes
of their many critics, the guidelines are unduly simplistic, failing
to make distinctions that matter, and limiting the flexibility of
sentencing judges to respond to relevant differences. Yet by
comparison to the mandatory minima, they are masterpieces of
subtlety, nuance, and thoughtfulness. And the guidelines per-
mitjudges, in truly unusual cases and subject to appellate review
at the government's instance, to depart and impose a lower sen-
tence; though presumptively mandatory, for exceptional cause
U.S. SENTENCINGGUIDEUINESMANUAL§§ 3B1.1, 3B1.2 (2000).
"
7 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 2D 1.1(b) (1), (2).
"Base offense level of 32 for the amount and quantity of drugs, U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1 (c) (4), plus 4 as an organizer or leader of a large organi-
zation, U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §3B1.1 (a), plus 2 for using a minor in
the offense, U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.4, totaling level 38. For a first
offender, the guideline sentencing range would be 235-293 months. U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL Gh. 5 Pt. A (Sentencing Table).
" The same base offense level of 32, U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §
2D1.1 (c) (4), in this case reduced by four levels for a minimal role in the offense, U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.2(a).
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they can be treated as true guidelines. The mandatory minima
(save for cooperation with the governmen ° and an extremely
limited "safety valve" provision 4 ) are absolute. If, in Eddie's
case, the guidelines project a sentence of six and a half years but
the mandatory statute requires ten, a sense that the latter is ex-
cessive is supported not simply by a (quantitative, political) con-
clusion that the guidelines' provenance is likely to make them
tough enough for most tastes, but also by a (methodological,
technical, professional) conclusion that the guidelines' method
of arriving at six and a half years as the appropriate sentence
has taken more of the appropriate factors into account, and has
taken a much more defensible view of what is relevant in deter-
mining his just desert.
One additional procedural fact needs to be recalled. To the
extent that discretion exists in a system of mandatory sentenc-
ing, that discretion is shifted from judges-appointed by the
President and confirmed by the Senate, usually of mature years
and wide experience-to prosecutors. That the mandatory
minimum in Eddie's case was ten years, rather than twenty, was
solely due to a tactical trial decision by the prosecutor. I intend
no criticism of the prosecutor, who I think made a choice that
was both just and tactically shrewd, by pointing out that this was
a rather spontaneous, nearly casual, decision, made on the spur
of the moment by a rather young prosecutor in the heat of trial.
Though the decision surely was made against a background view
that ten years was somehow "enough" to satisfy concerns ofjus-
tice and public policy, the principal motivation at the moment
was one of trial strategy, which could well have gone the other
way. Had he made the opposite call, and the jury made the re-
quested finding, the judge would have been required to impose
a twenty-year sentence: under those circumstances, the judge
would not have had the same discretion to reduce the sentence
to ten-in the light of all relevant sentencing factors, for sub-
stantial reasons of justice stated on the record and subject to
appellate review-that the prosecutor had to accomplish the
same result-for reasons largely unrelated to culpability, with
no public statement of reasons, and with little or no supervision.
Moreover, the prosecutor could have chosen, before trial, not to
file the prior felony information (reducing the mandatory sen-
4
,U.S. SENTENGINGGUIDELINESMANUAL§ 5K1.1; 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (1994).
4 18 U.S.C. § 3553(0.
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tence to five years), or not to charge a particular amount in the
indictment (arguably eliminating the mandatory minimum al-
together). And if the defendant had agreed to plead guilty,
there is little doubt that these options would have been exer-
cised. Since a guilty plea would have adjusted the sentencing
level downward by as much as three points,42 avoiding the man-
datory minimum sentence would have enabled the prosecutor,
in his unilateral discretion, to bring Eddie's guideline sentence
down to as low as fifty-seven months--or even lower if the
prosecutor further agreed, to avoid costly litigation over the
credibility of his cooperating witness, to discount somewhat the
witness's account of the amount of cocaine Eddie had bought.
At the end of the day, it is possible that Eddie paid a higher
price for exercising his right to ajury trial than for the crime he
committed.
V.
Does it matter? Of course, the cases cited by the columnists
seem to matter more. Someone who probably should not be
jailed at all who is sent to prison for five years has been treated
terribly unjustly, and it is easy to sympathize with someone
whose story suggests that his or her culpability was minimal.
Someone like Eddie, in contrast, has deliberately, repeatedly,
violated the law; his culpability is clear, a sentence of some
weight is certainly deserved; and the precise number of years
awarded is necessarily somewhat arbitrary. That's why he's not
the poster child of the movement to repeal mandatory mini-
mum sentences. And in a political context in which we often
speak rather casually of doubling sentences that are already
quite brutal (by the standards of the industrialized, democratic
world that we like to think should take its lead from us in hu-
man rights), who cares about a "mere" excess of a few years'
punishment?
But if the injustice in Eddie's case is less serious than in the
more unusual cases that are used to highlight the campaign
against mandatory minimum sentences, I submit that we still
ought to care, and to care a lot. First, even in this single indi-
4
'U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3El.1.
,' At level 23, the guideline sentencing range for someone in Criminal History
Category III would be 57-71 months, allowing a sentence of under five years. U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL Ch. 5 Pt. A (Sentencing Table).
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vidual case, the difference between 78 months and 120 is no
small amount. The guideline sentence of seventy-eight months
is hardly trivial: imagine being sent away from your family when
your daughter was eleven, and returning on her eighteenth
birthday; or consider going to jail with your mother aged sev-
enty-five, and guessing whether she'll still be living at nearly
eight-two, when you get out. That is just about exactly what
would have happened to Eddie under the guideline sentence.
Now consider the add-on under the mandatory minimum: three
and a half additional years. That is longer than you spent in law
school, dear reader, and about as long as your, or your child's,
college or high-school years. If that increment in punishment is
excessive, that is not, in my book, a trivial injustice.
Now ask how many Eddies are out there, getting how many
cumulative years of incarceration, at what expense to them, to
their families, to the public treasury, and to our sense of human
decency.
Let me back up to where I began, and remind you of my as-
sumptions. I do not think Eddie should be treated lightly. I am
not questioning the need for or appropriateness of criminal
laws against selling drugs. I am not even arguing that there's
some clear-cut, objective way of determining whether ten years
is in some absolute sense an unjust sentence for a person with
his record who did what he did. Nor am I questioning the idea
of sentencing guidelines and control of judicial discretion-
note that if Eddie had received even the lowest available
guideline sentence for the crime he was convicted of in Miami
in 1997, instead of probation, he would never have committed
the offense for which I sentenced him, and he would now be
getting ready for release instead of looking at nine more years
in prison." I am just asking those who read this to consider
exactly how the federal mandatory minimum sentences for drug
crimes operate, and what the sentences imposed under that
regime actually mean in particular cases, and then to consider
whether-at least in the federal system, which already has a
44At any rate, a country in which a defendant goes from probation in one jurisdic-
tion to ten years' imprisonment for a crime of somewhat comparable magnitude in
another probably doesn't need, in the aggregate, more judicial discretion or more
judicial leniency. I suppose one of my points is that campaign slogans, at such a gen-
eral level, asserting that we need stricter or more lenient sentences, more guidelines
or more discretion, are inherently misleading- we need to examine more closely par-
ticularsentencing regimes as they apply to particular crimes.
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in the federal system, which already has a comprehensive guide-
lines regime-the statutory minimum sentence provisions are
just or unjust, desirable or not, worth the price we pay for them
or unnecessarily costly.
I did not expect sentencing people to prison to feel good.
But I was sorry and surprised to find that the very first sentence
I imposed felt like an injustice. And not a small one.
